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ABSTRACT. Lawyers and the legal system have
been much criticized in recent years. Despite popular
perceptions, the legal system contains numerous
mechanisms and rules designed to ensure fair results.
This paper shows how the legal system tries to
implement, in commercial transactions, the ethical
principles of truthfulness and fairness. The Anglo-
American development of Equity Courts is reviewed
briefly. Several examples of the Law’s enforcement of
ethical principles are presented, in four different legal
areas: Contracts, Securities, Goods, and Real Estate.
The intent here is to present an overview of the
problem, with area-specific illustrations, rather than
a comprehenisve examination of the cases in just one
area.
Ethical principles
Out of the many ethical principles developed
over the centuries, two – Truthfulness and
Fairness – seem particularly relevant to legal
relationships. Both are also principles of long
standing, dating back at least to Aristotle’s great
work, Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle, 1952).
Truthfulness is required in commercial trans-
actions, and indeed in all human interactions,
because we communicate with each other. We
exchange information, and then act, at least in
part, on the basis of that information. Lying to
the other party, in the hopes of gaining a com-
mercial advantage, would generally be defined
as unethical conduct. For Aristotle, the truth-
teller was “worthy of praise.” “[T]he man who
loves truth, and is truthful where nothing is at
stake, will still more be truthful where something
is at stake; he will avoid falsehood as something
base, seeing that he avoided it even for its own
sake; and such a man is worthy of praise”
(Aristotle, 1952).
Fairness, in the context of commercial trans-
actions, implies an exchange of values of approx-
imate equality. At least as of the time of the
exchange, each party believes she is receiving
value for value given. It is of course often true
that our expectations are not fulfilled. Some of
the things we receive turn out not to be as useful
or as pleasurable as we imagined they would be.
To a great extent, that is simply the nature of
things. We often desire something intensely, only
to be severely disappointed by the post-acquisi-
tion actuality. Fairness in the ethical sense does
not imply the “complete satisfaction” which is
used in so many advertisements. Fairness does
mean that each party receive the thing bargained
for, and that the thing have a real value. Aristotle
also discussed fairness, in the context of what is
just: “Both the lawless man and the grasping and
unfair man are thought to be unjust, so that evi-
dently both the law-abiding and the fair man will
be just. The just, then, is the lawful and the fair,
the unjust the unlawful and the unfair (Aristotle,
1952).
The idea of dealing fairly and justly with
other persons is “the greatest of virtues”
(Aristotle, 1952). “It is complete [virtue] because
he who possesses it can exercise his virtue not
only in himself but towards his neighbor also; for
many men can exercise virtue in their own
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affairs, but not in their relations to their
neighbor” (Aristotle, 1952).
How, then, does our modern legal system try
to implement these two great ethical princples?
Equity
Systemic need for equity
Appropriately enough, it is also Aristotle who
best explains a legal system’s need for Equity.
Equity’s flexibility is required to supplement the
rigidity of the general legal rules, to provide for
the exceptional case: “Our next subject is equity
and the equitable . . . , and their respective rela-
tions to justice and the just. . . . What creates the
problem is that the equitable is just, but not the
legally just but a correction of legal justice. The
reason is that all law is universal but about some
things it is not possible to make a universal state-
ment which shall be correct. In those cases, then,
in which it is necessary to speak universally, but
not possible to do so correctly, the law takes
the usual case, though it is not ignorant of the
possibility of error. . . . When the law speaks
universally, then, and a case arises on it which is
not covered by the universal statement, then it
is right, where the legislator fails us and has erred
by over-simplicity, to correct the omission – to
say what the legislator himself would have said
had he been present, and would have put into his
law if he had known” (Aristotle, 1952).
Equity in England
The English legal system responded to its need
for equity by developing a second set of courts,
using different judges (the chancellors) to admin-
ister these supplementary principles. According
to Plucknett, however, “many rules which have
since become distinctive of chancery make their
first appearance in the common law courts”
(Plucknett, 1956). Further, he says, “[t]here was,
therefore, no fundamental inconsistency between
equity and common law; the one was not
alien to the other” (Plucknett, 1956). The new
Chancery Court “did not originate English
Equity, for it simply carried on the work of the
older courts by developing in greater fullness and
with a different machinery the equity inherent
in royal justice” (Plucknett, 1956).
There was no logical necessity for using
different courts to administer the principles of
equity. Plucknett remarks on “the abandonment
by the common law judges of their ancient
powers of discretion” (Plucknett, 1956). Why
this happened remains somewhat unclear.
Political factors – fear of giving too much power
and independence to the common law judges –
probably played a part. Philosophically, most
common law lawyers and judges preferred the
law’s certainty to equity’s flexibility. Plucknett
notes that “the common law was essentially the
law of land” (Plucknett, 1956). Land titles and
land transactions required certainty, not creativity.
“The [common law] lawyers had a maxim that
they would tolerate a ‘mischief ’ (a failure of sub-
stantial justice in a particular case) rather than
an ‘inconvenience’ (a breach of legal principle)”
(Plucknett, 1956).
The chancellors, acting in the king’s name,
developed a set of equitable remedies for situa-
tions where the normal remedies of the common
law did not provide complete justice. The
injunction was the equity remedy to prevent a
continuing wrong. The equity court ordered the
offender to cease and desist, in the king’s name.
Failure to comply with the court order could
result in fine and/or imprisonment. Specific per-
formance was the remedy to require performance
of a contract for land or for unique goods.
Money damages, the usual common law remedy,
would not provide adequate relief in such cases,
since the plaintiff would still not have the thing
bargained for. The chancellors also developed an
assortment of other remedies to deal with special
situations, including reformation, rescission, resti-
tution, and redemption. They recognized rights
created by assignments and trusts. In sum, it was
the chancery courts, applying the principles of
equity, which provided the rules required by a
developing English society.
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Transplantation of equity
Many aspects of the English legal system
were transplanted to the American colonies.
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England,
first published in 1765, were widely read and
widely used in America. “The Commentaries had
a tremendous sale there, for not only did they
contain some very useful matter on public law,
but also served as the principal means of the
colonists’ information as to the state of English
law in general” (Plucknett, 1956).
After independence, guarantees of the right to
trial by jury were written into the national
Constitution and the constitutions of most, if not
all, states. The Seventh Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution preserves the right to a trial by jury
in civil cases at common law involving $20 or
more. The key phrase “at common law” thus
excludes equity cases, and freezes the law/equity
distinction into the Constitution. Later, when
most states and the national courts combined
legal procedure with equity procedure, these
constitutional provisions meant that the statutory
combination could not be complete. The law/
equity distinction still has to be made to deter-
mine whether the parties are entitled to a trial
by jury.
Equity today
England reunited Law and Equity, by statute, in
1875 (Curzon, 1968). Similar recombination has
taken place in the U.S. courts and in most states.
Judges in these “combined” courts have all the
powers of the common law judges and all the
powers of the equity chancellors. A few states still
maintain separate equity courts, most notably
Delaware, where many corporate litigations are
heard by the Chancery Court.
Whether administered by a separate court or
not, the function of Equity remains essentially
what it has been for centuries – providing special
remedies to do more complete justice between
the parties. In this sense, then, Equity continues
to serve as “the keeper of the King’s [Queen’s]
conscience” (Rienow, 1952). The “maxims” of
Equity developed by the chancellors retain their
force and utility: “Equity acts on the con-
science;” “Equity looks to the intent rather than
to the form;” “He who seeks equity must do
equity” (Curzon, 1968). Perhaps the greatest and
most basic equitable principle of all is stated as:
“Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a
remedy” (Curzon, 1968). Even though no longer
separate and independent, Equity operates within
our modern legal system as a built-in guarantor
of the ethical principle of Fairness.
Ethical standards in legal decisions
A variety of specific legal rules have been
developed to ensure Truthfulness and Fairness in
commercial transactions. This section examines
several of them, taken from Contract Law,
Securities Law, Sales of Goods Law, and
Landlord/Tenant Law. These examples are not
intended to be exhaustive, merely illustrative. 
One caveat should be kept in mind during this
review of specifics: there are certain systemic
constraints on the courts’ ability to supervise
legal relationships. A major premise of our free,
democratic society is the decision-making
capacity of the individual citizen. Likewise, our
free enterprise system is based on Contract rather
than Status – freely made relationships, rather
than inherited group membership. There is thus
a strong presumption in favor of allowing persons
to negotiate their own legal relationships, and
then requiring the fulfillment of those relation-
ships. Courts therefore usually feel it necessary
to explain why they are modifying the parties’
bargain, or refusing to enforce it as negotiated.
Contract enforcement
Adequate consideration
As a rule, the law emphasizes freedom of
contract, and permits the parties to set the terms
of their own bargain. Usually, the value of the
things exchanged is determined by the parties
themselves. Once made, their bargain binds both
of them to perform it according to its terms.
When one party breaches by failing to perform,
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the other can get court remedies by showing that
there was a bargain for an exchange of “suffi-
cient” considerations. Legal sufficiency does not
require proof of equal values, only that some sort
of performance was required of each party.
Early on, however, courts of equity required
a higher standard of a party seeking specific per-
formance. One of the equitable maxims noted
above was that “he who seeks equity must do
equity.” Applying this maxim, equity courts
required proof that an “adequate” consideration
had been promised in exchange for the land or
unique goods which the plaintiff was seeking
through specific performance. As stated by the
New York appellate court in an early case: “A
court of equity must be satisified that the claim
for a deed is fair and just, and reasonable, and the
contract equal in all its parts, and founded on an
adequate consideration, before it will interpose
with this extraordinary assistance” (Seymour,
1824). “Adequate” in this sense meant at least an
approximation of equal values to be exchanged.
$5000, for example, would usually be deemed a
“sufficient” consideration, but would not be an
“adequate” consideration in exchange for a farm
worth $50,000, such as to justify specific perfor-
mance. Persons appealing to “the court of the
Queen’s conscience” for a special remedy must
show the inherent fairness of the contracts they
are seeking to enforce.
Gross inadequacy of consideration
A related rule states that a gross disparity in the
exchange is some evidence that the transaction
was based on fraud or mistake. For instance, in
an Illinois case, O’Neill claimed that he owned
a valuable painting as the result of a sale of it to
him by Mr. Delaney, for $10 and “other good
and valuable consideration.” The “other good
and valuable consideration” turned out to be
nothing more than friendly feelings between the
two men, while the painting was worth at least
$100,000. The Illinois court sustained Mrs.
Delaney’s objections to the so-called “sale.” In
the words of the court: “A purchase price of $10
for such a valuable work of art is so grossly inad-
equate consideration as to shock the conscience
of this court, as it did the trial court’s. To find
$10 valid consideration for this painting would
be to reduce the requirement of consideration
to a mere formality. This we will not do”
(O’Neill, 1980). In sum, the purported “sale” was
fraudulent, and therefore invalid. 
Courts may also find that no contract exists
where one party’s mistake is so gross that the
other party must have known it to be such. In a
California case, Kemper sued to rescind a bid it
had made on a Los Angeles sewer project. Over
1000 items were involved in preparing the bid;
three Kemper employees worked on it until 2
a.m. of the day bids were due. In totalling up the
bid, they left out one page of items worth
$301,769. Kemper’s bid was stated as $780,305.
The three competing bids were $1,049,592;
$1,183,000; and $1,278,895. The city insisted
that Kemper due the work for $780,305, or
forfeit the ten percent bond it had posted to
guarantee performance. The court held that the
city should have been aware of this obvious
mistake, and that there was therefore no contract.
The city was required to give Kemper back
the bond money (Kemper, 1951). Clearly, the
California court worked out the fair result in this
case.
Unconscionability
The drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code
included a section (2-302) on unconscionable
contracts. Since it was part of Article 2, it there-
fore applied only to contracts for the sale of
goods. The courts, however, were quick to assert
that their power to invalidate unconscionable
contracts had always been part of the common
law.
The leading case on unconscionability is
Williams (1965). Ms. Williams had signed a
credit contract with the furniture store and had
purchased several items there, on credit. The
form contract stated that the customer was only
“leasing” the items until they were fully paid for.
Further, the contract said that payments would
be applied pro rata to each item bought on
credit, and that all items not paid for in full
would be collateral for any unpaid balance.
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Williams missed a payment, and the store threat-
ened to repossess all the items she had purchased,
since none had been paid for in full under the
pro rata arrangement. Williams sued to have the
pro rata clause and the repossession clause in the
contract declared unconscionable. The lower
court refused to rule in her favor, since the UCC
was not in force in D.C. when she signed the
contract. The D.C. Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that courts have always had the inherent
power to refuse to enforce grossly unfair bargains
(Williams, 1965).
Courts have made similar rulings in contracts
not involving the sale of goods at all. A Michigan
court applied the unconscionability principle to
invalidate a grossly unfair clause in an employ-
ment contract. The employee in question worked
as a sales representative and received commissions
on sales made. According to his contract,
however, if he left the company for any reason,
he would receive commissions only for those
goods which had actually been delivered to cus-
tomers as of the date of termination. When he
left, he had made a significant sale of merchan-
dise which had not yet been delivered to the
customer involved. He sued when the company
refused to pay the commission on that sale.
The Michigan court held that the “delivery”
clause in the employment contract was uncon-
scionable, and that the company did owe the
commission on the undelivered merchandise
(Reed, 1972). It seems clear that most courts
today will modify or will refuse to enforce grossly
unfair contracts.
Moral obligation as consideration
The general legal rule on a moral obligation as
consideration runs counter to the thesis of this
paper. Generally, one party’s moral obligation to
do something is not treated as legally sufficient
consideration for her promise to do it. The
Restatement of the Law of Contracts uses the
example of a promise made to a dying partner.
On his death-bed, partner A expresses concern
about his wife’s financial future. Partner B reas-
sures him: “Don’t worry; I’ll take care of her.”
The Restatement says that B is not legally bound
to perform this promise, even though B might
have a moral obligation to do so.
Even here, however, there are several notable
exceptions, which are consistent with the thrust
of this paper. Many states do enforce new
promises to pay old debts which have been
barred by the running of the statute of limita-
tions, or by a discharge in bankruptcy. Some
states may require these new promises to be
made in a signed writing to be enforceable, but
new consideration is not required. The fairness
inherent in these two exceptions is obvious: there
was a contract, value was given by one party but
not by the other, there is a legal technicality
which prevents suit to enforce the debt. If the
debtor now promises to pay the previously valid,
but now unenforceable debt, why should she not
be held to her promise?
Some states also enforce promises made to
charitable organizations on the basis of an under-
lying moral obligation to support “good works.”
Other states may enforce charitable promises
under a different legal theory – promissory
estoppel, or may find mutual promises not to
revoke implied as between the promisors.
Promissory estoppel
Another fairness issue occurs where a promisee
reasonably relies on a non-contractual promise
and takes substantial action because of it. The
promisor argues that there was no contract, and
so she should not be bound by her promise. At
least in some of these cases, the courts apply the
doctrine of promissory estoppel. The promisor is
estopped (prevented) from making the “no con-
sideration = no contract” argument where her
promise has induced a promisee to make a sub-
stantial change in legal position in reasonable
reliance on the promise.
The classic case applying promissory estoppel
is Hoffman (1964). The Hoffmans wanted a
franchise for a Red Owl store. The Red Owl
representative told them that they would need
to satisfy several requirements to qualify. The
Hoffmans sold their home in one city, moved to
the designated franchise city, bought a store there
to gain the required retail experience, bought a
Ethics and Equity 165
site there for the proposed Red Owl store, and
assembled the capital amount indicated. When
they contacted the Red Owl representative about
their franchise, he informed them that the capital
requirements had been raised. The Hoffmans
were unable to raise the additional capital, and
sued for breach of contract when their Red Owl
franchise was refused. The Wisconsin court said
that promisees in this situation should at least be
permitted to recover the losses they had sustained
by acting in reliance on the promise (Hoffman,
1964). Here again, fairness prevails.
Equitable estoppel
The principle of estoppel is also used to produce
a fair result where the promisor argues that no
contract can be enforced because of the absence
of a signed writing, even though substantial
values have already been transferred to him.
Generally, where a contract is required by the
Statute of Frauds to be evidenced by a signed
writing and there is no such writing, the contract
is indeed unenforceable in court. There is,
however, a widely recognized exception which
permits the enforcement of oral real estate con-
tracts in certain circumstances.
This exception is most typically applied where
the land seller has permitted the buyer to take
possession, and to make substantial permanent
improvements on the premises. The land seller
then claims that the oral contract is unenforce-
able, and demands return of the (improved) land.
In many such cases, the equity court estops the
land seller from arguing the Statute of Frauds,
and enforces the oral land contract.
A rather unusual case from California shows
the scope of the doctrine of equitable estoppel.
Annie Porporato’s husband was killed in military
action in 1943. She had been living in San
Francisco in a house owned by her father-in-law,
John. When her husband died, Annie returned,
with her son, to her family home in Omaha,
Nebraska. John said that if she would come back
to San Francisco and live there so that he could
be near his grandson, she would be given the
house when John died. She did so, and lived
there for 20 years. When John died, he left the
house to Anita DeVincenzi. Even though Annie
had nothing in writing, the California court
estopped Anita and John’s estate from arguing the
Statute of Frauds. Annie had given John exactly
the value he requested, and there was no way to
give her back 20 years of her life. She got the
house (Porporato, 1968).
Nondisclosure as Fraud
It is true that, as a rule, nondisclosure of material
information is not treated as a fraudulent mis-
representation of fact. The reason underlying
that rule is that parties usually have no legal
duty to make such disclosures. Persons dealing
at arm’s length with complete strangers normally
do not expect those other parties to provide
full information voluntarily. We expect to ask
questions, to make inspections, to demand
verifications.
Even here, however, there are several well-
established exceptions which require truthfulness
and fairness. First, if one of the parties occupies
a fiduciary relationship with respect to the other,
full disclosure by the fiduciary is required in any
commercial transaction between them. A lawyer
buying real estate from a client, for example,
would be required to disclose information
regarding the value of the land, such as mineral
deposits, unknown to the client. Second, the law
requires a corrective disclosure where one party
has made prior statements to the other, which,
although true when made, have since become
incorrect. The speaker knows that the other party
is still relying on the truth of the original state-
ment in evaluating the transaction. The speaker
must now volunteer the correct information.
A third exception is more difficult to define.
The Restatement of Contracts also requires disclo-
sure of “essential” information – facts so impor-
tant that the contract might not have been made
had the other party been aware of them. This
“exception” has the potential for swallowing up
the general rule, since nearly all litigations over
undisclosed facts would concern “important”
facts. In practice, courts seem to have applied this
third exception primarily in cases involving
hidden dangerous conditions in buildings or
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goods being purchased. Janinda (1964) provides
one such example.
Harold Janinda was transferred by his employer
from Denver, Colorado, to Mountain Home,
Idaho. Looking for housing there, Janinda was
shown several locations by a realtor. One of these
was a complex owned by Mrs. Lanning. On the
property were rental spaces for six house trailers,
several duplex apartments, and a three-bedroom
house. Two wells on the premises furnished the
water for the complex. One of the wells was
contaminated, a fact known to Mrs. Lanning, but
not disclosed to Janinda. He bought the property,
and then discovered the contamination. The
Idaho court said that Mrs. Lanning’s failure to
disclose this “dangerous physical condition” was
fraudulent, justifying Janinda’s rescission of the
contract. Her lack of truthfulness required can-
cellation of the transaction in order to produce
a fair result (Janinda, 1964).
Securities law
Sales of investment securities are of course
contracts, and therefore subject to the general
common law rules discussed above. In this area,
however, significant extra requirements have been
added by statutes and regulations. These “extras”
move securities law towards more truthfulness
and more fairness.
Uniform Commercial Code
The basic requirements for contracts involving
investment securities are set out in Article 8 of
the Uniform Commercial Code. However, the
general provisions from Article 1 apply to all
transactions covered by the UCC. Section 1-203
imposes an obligation of “good faith” in the
performance or enforcement of contracts. “Good
faith” is defined in Section 1-201(17) as meaning
“honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction
involved.” 
The UCC generally permits the parties to
negotiate their own terms. Section 1-102(3)
states that “[t]he effect of provisions of this Act
may be varied by agreement, except as otherwise
provided in this Act. . . .” There is also a second
important exception: “the obligations of good
faith, diligence, reasonableness and care pre-
scribed by this Act may not be disclaimed by
agreement. . . .” To be sure, the parties may by
agreement “determine the standards by which
the performance of such obligations is to be
measured,” but such standards themselves must
not be “manifestly unreasonable.”
Most of the detailed rules in Article 8 cover
the technicalities involved in the issuance and
transfer of stocks and bonds. One section – that
dealing with sellers’ warranties – does seem
appropriate to this discussion. A person transfer-
ring a security represented by a certificate makes
three warranties to a purchaser for value. First,
the transfer of the security is guaranteed to be
effective and rightful. Second, there is a guar-
antee that the security itself is genuine and that
it has not been materially altered. Finally, and
most relevant here, the securities seller warrants
that “he knows of no fact which might impair
the validity of the security.” This last statement,
in particular, would require disclosure of infor-
mation in some cases, to avoid liability for breach
of warranty.
Securities Act of 1933
Issuers subject to the 1933 Securities Act are
also required to make substantial public disclo-
sures. The objective of the 1933 Act was “truth
in securities” – to provide sufficient data so
that investors could make an informed decision.
The general common law rule did not impose
an affirmative duty of disclosure on a securities
seller (Strong, 1919). Prior registration with the
Securities and Exchange Commission is now
required for stocks and bonds which are to
be offered to the public, through interstate
commerce.
The registration statement filed with the SEC
must contain descriptions of the securities being
offered, the issuing company’s business, the
company’s management and their compensation,
any pending litigation involving the company, the
company’s intended use of the proceeds received
for the offered securities, the degree of compe-
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tition in the company’s business, and any special
risk factors. Financial statements, certified by a
licensed CPA, must also be filed. Violations of
the filing requirements can result in both civil
and criminal liability, for the company and for
the managers involved. Truthfulness is thus
mandated at the time of the initial issuance of
investment securities.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934
The second major national statute regulating
securities transactions, the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act, also requires public filing of infor-
mation. Periodic reports must be filed by com-
panies who have made a registered offering of
securities under the 1933 Act, or whose equity
securities are traded on a national exchange, or
who have assets of more than $5 million and
more than 500 shareholders. Such companies
must file annual reports and quarterly reports
with the SEC. In addition, special reports must
be filed within 10 days after the end of any
month in which a “material event,” such as a
merger, occurs.
The 1934 Act, however, goes far beyond mere
filing of reports. “Insider” transactions are also
strictly regulated, in two different ways. Section
16 of the Act requires that “short-swing” profits
made by an “insider” from transactions in the
company’s securities must be turned over to the
company. Section 10(b), which is the general
anti-fraud provision, also applies to unfair use of
inside information.
Section 16 defines insiders as including direc-
tors, officers, and owners of 10 percent or more
of the company’s stock. Such statutory insiders
must file reports with the SEC disclosing their
transactions in the company’s stock, within ten
days after the end of the month in which such
transactions occurred. Where such insiders make
profits as a result of pairs of trades occurring
within six months of each other, the profits
belong to the corporation. Section 16(b) imposes
a kind of strict liability on these statutory
insiders, since no actual misuse of inside infor-
mation or intent to do so need be shown.
In contrast, Section 10(b) and implementing
SEC Rule 10(b)-5 do require proof of a
“manupulative or deceptive device or con-
trivance,” in connection with the purchase or sale
of a security. The Supreme Court has ruled that
“mere” negligence is not a sufficient basis for
this case; a “plan” or “scheme” must be shown
(Ernst, 1977). Knowing misuse of inside infor-
mation does meet the statutory definition in
10(b). Other persons besides the statutory
insiders may be held liable under section 10(b).
Anyone having a “fiduciary relationship” to the
other party to the securities transaction has a duty
to disclose material information (Chiarella, 1980;
Dirks, 1983). More recently, the U.S. Supreme
Court has adopted a “misappropriation” theory,
under which persons who use confidential infor-
mation owned by others may also be prosecuted
(Carpenter, 1987). Where violations are proved,
the securities sale may be rescinded or damages
may be awarded, and civil and criminal penal-
ties may be imposed on the wrongdoer.
Securities law thus contains a number of
provisions designed to ensure Truthfulness and
Fairness.
Sales of goods
The law of sales of goods is now primarily statu-
tory – Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code. Several of its provisions promote the
ethical values of Truthfulness and Fairness.
Unconscionability
As previously discussed, UCC section 2-302 was
the impetus for a new recognition by the courts
of the doctrine of unconscionability. Section
2-302 requires the trial judge, rather than the
jury, to make the determination of uncon-
scionability. Where a contract provision is found
to be unconscionable, the judge is given three
options: invalidate the entire contract, invalidate
the offending clause and enforce the rest of the
contract, or interpret the unconscionable clause
so as to avoid any unconscionable result.
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Good faith
Since Article 2 is part of the UCC, the general
good faith provisions from Article 1 also apply to
sales of goods. The good faith requirements
imposed by sections 1-203 and 1-102(3) were
discussed above, in connection with sales of
securities.
Implied warranty of merchantability
Section 2-314 promotes fairness by imposing an
implied warranty on sellers who are merchants
with respect to the goods being sold. “Merchant”
is defined in section 2-104 as being a person
who is a dealer in such goods, or who by his
occupation holds himself out as having special
knowledge with respect to such goods, or who
is represented in the transaction by an agent
or broker who is held out as having such
knowledge.
The implied warranty of merchantability
imposes a minimum performance standard on the
goods. Section 2-314 contains a six-part defini-
tion of “merchantability.” The two basic require-
ments are that the goods must be “fit for the
ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used” and that they will “pass without objection
in the trade under the contract description.”
Fungible goods, such as sheet steel or crates of
apples, must be “of fair, average quality within
the description.” Multiple units must “run,
within the variations permitted by the agree-
ment, of even kind, quality and quantity within
each unit and among all units involved.” The
goods must be “adequately contained, packaged
and labelled as the agreement may require” and
must “conform to the promises or affirmations
of fact made on the container or label, if any.”
Merchant sellers whose goods do not conform
to these minimal standards are liable for damages,
or for return of the contract price.
Section 2-316 does permit the seller to
disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability.
To be legally effective, the disclaimer must
mention merchantability. If the disclaimer is part
of a writing, it must be stated conspicuously –
different style or color of type, underlined, or
similar attention-getting devices. Merchantability
may also be disclaimed by the use of such phrases
as “with all faults” or “as is.” Even where the
statutory phraseology is used, courts may still
refuse to enforce a grossly unfair disclaimer, as
illustrated by Henningsen (1960).
Clause Henningsen bought his wife a new
Plymouth as a Mother’s Day present. As she was
driving the car ten days later, she heard a loud
noise under the hood. She said “it felt as if some-
thing had cracked.” The steering wheel spun in
her hands, and the car veered sharply to the right
and crashed into a brick wall. The standard
written warranty which came with the car dis-
claimed all liability other than replacement of
defective parts. The New Jersey court refused to
enforce the disclaimer, and held both seller and
manufacturer liable for all damages. The court
chastised the industry for using such an unfair
form disclaimer: “The terms of the warranty are
a sad commentary upon the automobile manu-
facturers’ marketing practices. . . . [W]arranties
originated in the law to safeguard the buyer and
not to limit the liability of the seller or manu-
facturer. It seems obvious in this instance that the
motive was to avoid the warranty obligations
which are normally incidental to such sales. The
language gave little and withdrew much. In
return for the delusive remedy of replacement
of defective parts at the factory, the buyer is said
to have accepted the exclusion of the maker’s lia-
bility for personal injuries arising from the breach
of the warranty. An instinctively felt sense of
justice cries out against such a sharp bargain”
(Henningsen, 1960). The court thus produces a
fair result by disregarding the non-negotiated
form disclaimer.
Limitation of remedies
Article 2 also permits the parties to agree on a
limitation of remedies and/or a limitation of
damages, in the event of a breach of the contract.
There are, however, two important limitations on
such agreements.
According to section 2-719(3), attempts to
limit liability for personal injuries caused by
defective consumer goods are prima facie uncon-
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scionable. Chrysler and Bloomfield Motors thus
could not disclaim liability for Mrs. Henningsen’s
personal injuries.
As to remedies relating to the defective
goods themselves, the parties’ limitation is not
enforceable where the limited remedy specified
“fails of its essential purpose.” In that instance,
says section 2-719(2), all the normal remedies
provided by Article 2 are available to the buyer.
Giving Mr. Henningsen the replacement part
which was defective would not be an adequate
remedy where his wife’s brand new Plymouth
had been totalled as a result of the defective
part.
Thus, while allowing a large measure of
freedom of contract in sales transactions, the
UCC is very much concerned with the fairness
of any bargains made.
Real estate leases
The common law rules regarding sales or leases
of real estate were rather harsh, by today’s stan-
dards. In general, the rule of caveat emptor was
strictly applied. The buyer or tenant was assumed
to take the premises “as is.” The seller or landlord
could be sued for fraud or for breach of contract
where specific promises were made, but other-
wise any deficiencies in the premises were borne
by the buyer or tenant.
State courts and legislatures have gradually
moved the landlord/tenant relationship in the
direction of Truthfulness and Fairness.
Statutory warranty of habitability
Many state and local governments have enacted
housing codes, which provide for minimum
standards of “habitability” for leased dwelling
areas. The landlord may have a duty to provide
screens for the windows, for instance. Many states
also have separate codes regulating the installa-
tion of mobile homes on rented spaces in mobile
home parks. Typically, both kinds of statutes
establish an enforcement agency, which makes
inspections and receives complaints. Landlords are
thus required by law to provide the statutory
minimums of safety and comfort, in exchange for
the rental payments.
Exculpatory clauses
Landlords frequently include lease provisions
which purport to limit their liability for occur-
rences on the premises. While freedom of
contract still prevails, there are certain outer
limits to the legal effectiveness of such exculpa-
tory clauses. One example of such limits appears
in State Farm (1979).
Ms. Kirsch and her son moved into a ground
floor apartment in a building owned by Mendez.
Middleton was the building manager. The lease
Kirsch signed exempted the landlord from lia-
bility for any damages done by plumbing, water,
or other pipes. Her apartment and the one
immediately above had “sleeves” in the outside
walls for air conditioners, but there were no air
conditioners in place. Instead, the sleeves were
covered with pieces of cardboard. During the
winter, the tenants in the apartment above filed
some 50 complaints with Middleton about cold
air coming in through the cardboard. Middleton
did nothing. Finally, a heating pipe froze, burst,
and poured water into Kirsch’s apartment. Her
insurer, State Farm, paid her for the loss, and
then sued Mendez and his insurance company
(Home). The Wisconsin court held that an
exculpatory clause can not be invoked where the
landlord or his agent is guilty (as here) of “active
or affirmative negligence” (State Farm, 1979). 
Refusals to lease
Another type of limitation on freedom of
contract occurs when the landlord refuses to
lease, or terminates an existing lease, on the basis
of certain prohibited criteria. State civil rights
statutes and local ordinances may prohibit such
discrimiantory conduct by landlords. Typically
prohibited is discrimination based on race, color,
religion, sex, or ancestry. Some such legislation
may also prohibit age discrimination in rental
housing, such as a prohibition against children
(Marina Point, 1980). The California civil rights
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statute has also been interpreted as prohibiting
discrimination against children in the sale of con-
dominium units (O’Connor, 1983).
Mitigation of damages
Historically, landlord-tenant law lagged behind
general contract law on one important “fairness”
rule: the duty to mitigate damages in the event
of a breach. The lease was treated as a conveyance
of an interest in the land, rather than as a
contract, in the case where the tenant moved out
before the term of the lease was up. The landlord
was generally not required to try to re-rent the
premises before suing the tenant for the
remaining rentals. 
Some courts first said that the landlord could
re-rent and then sue for the difference (Stewart,
1888; Scott, 1892). A minority of courts began
to require mitigation of damages by the landlord
(Wright, 1965). The fairness of the mitigation
requirement is starkly evident in Sommer (1977).
James Kridel leased an apartment from
Abraham Sommer for two years, May 1, 1972
to April 30, 1974. Rent was not to commence
until June 15, 1972, but Kridel paid one month
in advance and another month as a security
deposit (total $690). Kridel was engaged to be
married on June 3. The engagement was broken
and the wedding cancelled. James was discharged
from the Army in October 1971, and was a
student, supported by his step-father. He wrote
to Sommer on May 19, 1972, and explained all
this. He had never taken possession or been given
a key, so he had nothing to return. In his letter,
Kridel said: “I beg your understanding and com-
passion in releasing me from the lease. . . .” He
agreed to forfeit the $690. Having neither under-
standing nor compassion, Sommer waited 15
months and let $4658.50 in unpaid rentals accrue
before he finally tried to re-rent the apartment.
In the interim, a woman had asked to rent the
apartment, but was told that it was already rented
to Kridel. Holding that the case “present[ed] a
classic example of the unfairness” of the tradi-
tional rule, the New Jersey Supreme Court
refused to let Sommer collect his alleged damages
(Sommer, 1977).
Conclusions
Even this brief review, limited to four substan-
tive areas, should indicate the extent to which
U.S. legal institutions attempt to enforce the
ethical principles of Truthfulness and Fairness.
Most courts have tried to produce fair results by
relying on the general doctrines of Equity, as well
as subject-specific rules. Truthfulness is mandated
in many, if not yet all, legal negotiations. Where
necessary, legislation has been passed to promote
both these ethical precepts, and to prevent over-
reaching by large, powerful corporations. The
individual consumer/debtor thus has a range of
legal weapons available, should the need arise,
to produce ethical results.
But what does this overview tell us about the
relationship between Law and Ethics? Clearly,
the ethical sensitivities of judges play a part (often
a significant one) in their applications of the
legal rules to specific situations. Witness the
opinion of the New Jersey Supreme Court in the
Henningsen case, discussed earlier: “An instinc-
tively felt sense of justice cries out against such
a sharp bargain.” The Court tells us that the form
disclaimer of warranties at issue in that case was
being used by all U.S. car manufacturers. The
“morals of the marketplace” evidently saw no
inconsistency in extensively praising the products’
quality, selling the cars for several thousand
dollars, and then contractually saying “we don’t
even guarantee that these cars are reasonably
suitable for ordinary use.” Even though the mar-
ketplace was tolerating such inconsistency, the
New Jersey court thought it grossly unfair, and
thus refused to enforce the “sharp barghain.”
The legal concept of “unconscionability”
which the court applied in Henningsen itself
originated in the ethical views of the draftsmen
of the Uniform Commercial Code. Very much
aware of the moral shortcomings of the market-
place, the UCC drafters provided several
“contract checkpoints”: “good faith,” “care,”
“reasonableness,” etc. Courts seeking to work out
fair results in commercial transactions are thus
encouraged to do so, and have a variety of legal
doctrines to justify their interference with the
“bargain” made by the parties.
The market’s response to these ethical/legal
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changes in the rules is unclear – mixed, at best.
Carmakers do seem to have recognized some
responsibility for the performance of their multi-
thousand-dollar products. On the other hand,
they continue their attempts to limit liability, by
imposing a short time-frame (typically, one or
two years) for their express warranties. They also,
along with manufacturers in other industries
(most notably, consumer electronics), attempt to
sell very expensive “extended warranty” packages
on their new products. Consumers in many cases
thus seem to be paying for redundant warranty
coverage. So far, these “extended warranty” prac-
tices seem to have escaped judicial notice.
What then is the nature of the Law-Ethics
relationship in commercial transactions? One
perspecitve might be an analogy to the relation-
ship between Law and Equity. Normally, we
leave the parties to their own devices, and
enforce the bargains they have made. We also
need to recognize, however, that there are still
“robber barons” (both large and small) in the
marketplace. “Sharp bargains,” trickery, fraud,
and deception still occur. The Law must contain
enough flexibility, enough Equity, to deal with
these white-collar robbers. When the terms of a
contract offend a judge’s “instinctively felt sense
of justice,” legal doctrine necessary to produce a
fair result must be available.
The U.S. trend line over the last 30-plus years
seems quite clear – and hopeful. Courts have
greatly expanded warranty coverage on products.
Courts have applied the doctrine of “uncon-
scionability” to provisions in non-goods con-
tracts. Several courts have found an implied
promise of “good faith” in employment contracts
and insurance contracts. The Restatement of
Contracts now requires disclosure of “essential”
facts to the other contracting party. As more
and more courts adopt these rulings, we will
approach a point of greater symmetry between
Ethics and the Law.
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